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Résumé / Abstract
Dans un jeu de coordination expérimental avec deux équilibres stricts nous
observons que, contrairement à la théorie de sélection des équilibres (Harsanyi et
Selten 1988), seulement la moitié des participants choisissent la stratégie reliée à
l'équilibre qui est simultanément dominante par rapport au gain et dominante par
rapport au risque. Nous proposons d'utiliser la dominance au risque modifiée
comme explication des déviations observées par rapport à la dominance au gain et
la dominance au risque.
In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we
observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten
1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and
risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance as an
explanation for the observed deviations from payoff and risk dominance.
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11. Introduction
Coordination games are symmetric games with multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria. In such
games equilibrium behavior requires to know which of the equilibria the other players are aiming
at. Thus, we need a theory selecting a unique equilibrium. The most well-known equilibrium
selection theory is the one by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Their theory is based on two criteria,
payoff dominance and risk dominance. These criteria might have opposite implications. In that
case Harsanyi and Selten favor payoff dominance, which is based on the assumption of
collective rationality. However, there is no general consensus on this issue. While, for example,
also Anderlini (1990) chooses the payoff-dominant equilibrium, Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) and Harsanyi (1995) choose the risk-dominant equilibrium.
There exist many experimental studies examining this conflict case.1 The major results to be
drawn out of these experiments are that pre-play communication, the number of players, the time
horizon and the structure of interaction matters. In contrast to these studies, we present an
experiment in which we investigate equilibrium selection by subjects when payoff and risk
dominance predict the same equilibrium.
We present an experiment that is based on a simple two-player coordination game in which each
player chooses between two strategies. The game has two equilibria; of which one is both payoff
and risk dominant. Subjects played this game once. We observe a deviation from the payoff- and
risk-dominant equilibrium that is too great to be downgraded to noise.
Note that our experiment is one-shot and, thus, does not allow for learning. In application to real
world situations one might be also interested in repeated play and the process of learning. In our
study, however, we are interested in the self-enforcement nature of equilibria in one-shot games.
We understand our experimental result as a warning that we should investigate more on how
subjects actually choose among strategies in coordination games. Probably there are criteria
other than risk dominance and payoff dominance that play an important role in equilibrium
selection. For example, the security principle according to which players choose the strategy that
maximizes their minimum possible payoff is proposed by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990)
as a selection criterion. Vogt and Albers (1997) present modified risk dominance as a selection
criterion using a numerical transformation in the perception of payoffs. This transformation is
modeled by prominence theory (Albers 1997). We argue that modified risk dominance is a
convincing explanation for the large number of observed deviations from the risk- and payoff-
dominant equilibrium.
                                                          
1
 Among them are Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990, 1991), Van Huyck, Gillette, and Battalio (1992), Cooper,
DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1992), Van Huyck, Battalio, Beil (1993), Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994), Brandts
and MacLeod (1995), Cachon and Camerer (1996), Clark, Kay, and Sefton (1996), Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1996),
Croson and Marks (1996), Keser, Ehrhart, and Berninghaus (1998).
22. The game
We consider a symmetric two-player coordination game, in which each player chooses among
strategies X and Y. The payoff matrix is presented in Figure 1. The game has two strict equilibria
in pure strategies, (X,X) and (Y,Y). The (Y,Y)-equilibrium is payoff dominant as 50 < 70 and
risk-dominant as (50-5) < (70-20). Furthermore, the game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies
where each player chooses strategy X with probability 0.526.
X Y
X 50
50
20
  5
Y   5
20
70
70
Figure 1: Payoff table of the symmetric coordination game
3. The experiments
3.1 Experimental design
The experiments were run at the University of Karlsruhe. After participation in a three-player
experiment on decentralized or collective bargaining, subjects were invited to stay another ten
minutes in our (very different) experiment. Instructions (see appendix) were distributed and read
aloud. Subjects played the game once. They were not allowed to communicate and made their
decision independently at their computer terminals. The pairing of subjects was random and
anonymous. When all subjects had made their decisions, each participant was informed about his
or her payoff. Payoffs were in Deutsche Mark (DM). Thus, subjects could earn a relatively
important amount of money in a very short time. However, only one subject pair out of six pairs
was randomly chosen for cash payment. In total, forty-eight subjects participated in this
experiment.
3.2 Experimental results
Table 1 shows the frequencies with which subjects chose strategies X and Y. Forty-two percent
of the decisions were X-choices.
Table 1: Frequencies of X- and Y-choices
# subjects # X-choices # Y-choices
48 20 28
3Consider the null hypothesis that subjects choose strategy Y and, in the case of an error
occurring with probability ε, strategy X. For ε ≤ 0.25 a one-sided Binomial test allows us to
reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. Thus we may conclude that the observed
frequency of X-decisions cannot simply be due to errors.
4. Modified risk dominance
If subjects followed only risk and payoff dominance, they should have chosen strategy Y. We
observe, however, that subjects significantly deviate from this prediction. Are there equilibrium
selection theories that would predict the choice of X in our game? Let us consider modified risk
dominance (Vogt and Albers 1997) which  is based on prominence theory (Albers 1997).
4.1 Prominence Theory
Prominence theory is based on the empirical observation that some numbers are easier accessible
than others. The most easily accessible numbers in the decimal system are called the prominent
numbers P which are:
P = {n*10z|z∈Z, n∈{1,2,5}} = {...,0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100,....}.
The next accessible numbers are the spontaneous numbers S which are
S = {n*10z|z∈Z, n∈{-7, -5, -3, -2, -1.5, -1, 0, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 7}}.
The spontaneous numbers include the prominent numbers and one additional number between
any two neighbored prominent numbers in the negative and positive range.
In prominence theory the perception of numbers (for example, the payoffs in a game) is
described by “steps“. By definition, the difference between any two neighbored prominent
numbers (ordered according to their size) is one step. Accordingly, the difference between any
two neighbored spontaneous numbers (ordered according to their size) is half a step.
In specific tasks (contexts) different smallest amounts of money are important. For example, in
decisions in the context of the annual budget of a state, $1 billion might be perceived as the
smallest „important“ amount, whereas it might be between $1 to $5 for the price of a dinner. In
prominence theory this is modeled by assuming a “finest perceived full step“ unit ∆. The
difference between zero and this number is perceived as one step. The step structure and the
finest perceived full step defines, up to an additive constant, a perception function v∆. By
normalizing v∆(0) = 0, we get the function presented in Table 2 for ∆ = 20 and the spontaneous
numbers between –100 and +100.
4Table 2: Transformation of the spontaneous numbers between -100 and 100
by the v∆-function for ∆ = 20
number: -100, -70, -50, -30, -20, -15, -10, -5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 50, 70, 100
v20 : -3, -2.5, -2, -1.5, -1, -0.75, -0.5, -0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3
Note that for numbers x > ∆ the function v∆(x) is (nearly) equal to 3*log(x/∆)+1. Below the
smallest unit ∆ the function is linear2.
In a specific task (e.g. the experimental game) the finest perceived full step ∆ has to be
determined. Prominence theory proposes the following rule: ∆ is the prominent number that is
two steps below the smallest prominent number greater than or equal to the maximal payoff in
the task.
4.2 The selection criterion
Let us consider the symmetric bimatrix game presented in Figure 2 of which the game examined
in our experiment is a special case. The strategies are denoted by X and Y. For the payoffs it
holds that a > b > c > d. The equilibrium points are (X,X) and (Y,Y); (Y,Y) is payoff dominant.
X Y
X b
b
c
d
Y d
c
a
a
Figure 2: A symmetric 2x2 game
We apply the criterion of modified risk dominance proposed by Vogt and Albers (1997). For this
symmetric game the criterion of modified risk dominance is obtained from the concept of risk
dominance by the application of the v∆-function to the payoffs.
The criterion of risk dominance is:
(X,X) dominates (Y,Y) iff b – d > a – c.
                                                          
2
 This description of the perception is similar to the Weber-Fechner law (for example, in G.T. Fechner 1968) which
describes the perception of stimuli in psychophysics. Above a smallest unit, the perception is proportional to a
logarithmic function.
5Replacing the payoffs by the perceived payoffs (resulting from the application of the v∆-
function) we obtain the criterion of modified risk dominance:
(X,X) dominates (Y,Y) iff v∆(b) – v∆(d) > v∆(a) – v∆(c).
The application of the v∆-function does not effect the ordering of the payoffs as it is a monotonic
transformation. Thus, the (Y,Y)-equilibrium remains payoff dominant.
Prediction
For the prediction of this model the finest perceived full step ∆ has to be determined according to
the rule of prominence theory: The maximal payoff is 70. The smallest prominent number
greater than or equal to 70 is 100. ∆ is two steps below 100. This results in ∆ = 20. Thus, Table 2
(presented in Section 4.1 above) can be used for the transformation of the payoffs. The
transformed payoffs for the experimental game in Figure 1 are presented in Figure 3.
X Y
X 2
2
1
0.25
Y 0.25
1
2.5
2.5
Figure 3: The transformed payoffs
Applying the criterion of the modified risk dominance to this game leads to the following result.
(X,X) dominates (Y,Y),
since
v∆(b) – v∆(d) = 2 – 0.25 = 1.75   >   1.5 = 2.5 – 1 = v∆(a) – v∆(c).
Thus, the criterion of the modified risk dominance predicts that the equilibrium (X,X) is selected
in our game.
65. Discussion
In the literature we find other principles that might explain the choice of strategy X in our game.
Among them are the security principle (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990) and the selection of
mixed strategies.
Subjects following the security principle always select the so-called secure action. The secure
action is the strategy that maximizes the minimum possible payoff. In our game the secure action
is strategy X. The choices of X observed in our experiment could be interpreted with the security
principle. However, other studies show much less importance of this principle (Vogt and Albers
1997, Brandts and MacLeod 1995). They observe that payoffs other than the minimal guaranteed
one can have a great impact on the choices of subjects. Thus, we conclude that the security
principle can be only part of an explanation. Note that the security principle can be regarded as
an “ingredient” of modified risk dominance. Using the notation of Figure 3, the security principle
compares the payoffs c and d in a similar way to modified risk dominance. However, modified
risk dominance includes the additional comparison of payoffs a and b.
One might argue that subjects play mixed strategies. Following Nash (1950), mixed strategies
should be interpreted in terms of a state in a population where each player chooses a pure
strategy but the relative frequency with which each pure strategy is chosen corresponds to its
probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium. This interpretation is not convincingly applicable
to our one-shot game. It could probably make sense in repeated play or a learning environment
(see, for example, Oechssler 1995). Although in the experiment subjects have to decide on a pure
strategy, one might assume that each subject chooses a pure strategy based on the outcome of a
lottery prior to the experiment. Given this assumption, which is strongly criticized in the
literature, we might conclude that the probability of X in this lottery was 0.42, a number fairly
close to the mixed strategy equilibrium prediction. It had to be explained, however, why they
should select the mixed strategy equilibrium and not the payoff- and risk-dominant (Y,Y)-
equilibrium. The mixed strategy equilibrium is payoff dominated even by the (X,X)-equilibrium.
6. Conclusion
In our experimental coordination game we observe that an equilibrium that is neither payoff
dominant nor risk dominant is selected by almost fifty percent of the subjects. Among all
equilibrium selection theories known to us only modified risk dominance predicts this dominated
equilibrium. Given our experimental evidence and given that in previous studies (Vogt and
Albers 1997) modified risk dominance appears to be a better predictor for the equilibrium
selection in 2x2 games than risk dominance we conclude that the concept of modified risk
dominance should be included in the on-going discussion on equilibrium selection in
coordination games which is typically focussed on the notions of risk dominance and payoff
dominance.
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